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Chairman Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward development plan strongly affected food security in
rural China at the time, given that many of the associated policies exploited rural labor and extracted
resources. A few months after the plan’s initial implementation in August 1958, food shortages were
reported; by the spring of 1961, more than 30 million citizens had died of starvation and famine-related
illnesses. However, as the national plan was rolled out and then upheld over three years, on-the-ground
implementation was nonuniform. Using georeferenced terrain ruggedness data which captures small-
scale topological irregularities and information on provincial leadership attitudes towards Mao’s plan, I
provide evidence on forces underlying the famine’s intensity and distribution. The analysis is based on
a differential effect, in which a fear-based incentive structure characterizing the plan’s implementation is
implicitly embedded. The baseline results indicate that rugged terrain protected more than 4.6 million
rural Chinese from dying in the famine. By identifying an additional benefit of ruggedness to health and
well-being in some rural communities, I show that not only does a causal relationship exist at a local
level between Great Leap policies and famine mortality, but also that the lethality of the policies varied
per state power at the time.
JEL: Q18, H1, P2, N35, N45, N55, N95
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1 Introduction
Does greater state capacity always benefit citizens? Recently, this question been up for debate in the fields of economic
history and economic development (Besley and Persson, 2013; Johnson and Koyama, 2017). Drawing on a significant event in
mid-20th-century Chinese history, I provide evidence that, when a government pursues rash polices, high state capacity can
help bring about destructive consequences.
To provide a brief overview of the situation of concern, in 1958, Mao Zedong was the Chairman of the Chinese Communist
Party and enacted his development agenda for the next five years (1958-1962) called the Great Leap Forward (GLF). The plan’s
objective was to rapidly accelerate China’s industrialization and with the goal of overtaking British industry output within
15 years or less. A foundation of the scheme was the drastic reorganization of China’s rural labor force which made up the
vast majority of the country in order to optimize labor hours and output. However, in 1961, the GLF was abandoned after
more than 30 million citizens, primarily in rural areas, had died of starvation and related health complications (Ashton, 1984;
Bernstein, 2006; Cao, 2005; Peng, 1987).
This tragic period is known as the Great Chinese Famine. Already, researchers have established that specific agricultural
policies initiated by the GLF created some of the famine conditions (Bernstein, 1984; Chang and Wen, 1997, 1998; Fan, Xiong,
and Zhou, 2016; Houser, Sands, and Xiao, 2009; Jones and Poleman, 1962; Kung and Lin, 2003; Li and Yang, 2005; Lin, 1990;
Lin and Yang, 2000; Liu, 2010b,a; Liu, Wen, and Wei, 2014; Meng, Qian, and Yared, 2015; Yang, 1996, 2008). Additionally,
political incentives facing top bureaucrats at the time have been shown to have driven the radical implementation of the GLF
policies (Kung and Chen, 2011; Yang and Su, 1998; Yang, Xu, and Tao, 2014).
I propose that, like their higher-level political counterparts, an incentive structure also affected local leaders’ decisions to
implement GLF policies. Case in point, within the Cao and Yang (2015) assessment of the famine in Wuwei County of Anhui
Province (one of the areas that suffered the greatest mortality rates), the authors explain that local cadres “...were motivated
by sheer terror, as they were forced to adhere to campaign (GLF) rhetoric in order to preserve their own political lives [pp.
1689]...those (cadres) who had shown reservations or hesitation (regarding GLF policy implementation) were sent to labour
camps, where they were tortured [pp. 1697].”1
Simply put, local leaders implemented GLF policies at the peril of their constituents to save themselves. However, the
intensity with which a local leader implemented the GLF policies varied along two observable dimensions, the political leanings
of their direct provincial superiors and the ease with which the local’s leader implementation choice could be evaluated. I proxy
for these characteristics at the local level with (1) provincial adventurism in 1959 and (2) terrain ruggedness. I find that the
interaction of the two proxy variables predicts famine mortality (1959-61), such that higher famine mortality existed where a
local leader experienced more political pressure from his superiors and was more likely to be evaluated.
I detect a differential effect of terrain ruggedness on famine severity that arises from two competing relations. First, generally,
ruggedness is positively correlated with famine through underdevelopment, ruggedness→ underdevelopment→ famine. Second,
in the case of China between 1959 and 1961, the GLF effectuates another relationship between ruggedness and famine because
a number of important aspects of the GLF plan were likely sensitive to topographic hurdles. These policies could include grain
procurement, anti-concealment campaigns, agricultural collective size, mobilization of peasants as laborers for non-agricultural
projects, and restriction of exit rights from the collectives, among others. Therefore, in some areas ruggedness limited the Great
Leap and the related famine, ruggedness → Great Leap → survival. A principle objective of this research is to examine the
relative strength of these effects.
My methodology is based on Nunn and Puga (2012)’s demonstration of how terrain ruggedness limited the reach of slave
raiders in Africa. Application of this “rugged terrain as protection” hypothesis fits squarely into an Asian context. Scott
(2009)’s seminal exploration of the possibility that people can benefit from residing outside the reach of the state under an
extractive regime in set in Indochina and employs the Chinese dynastic state as one of its primary antagonist. A similar tension
between the Chinese state center and the local administration on the periphery at work in my model has been highlighted
1Words in parentheses were added by the author from the context.
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during the Literary Inquisition (1660-1788) (Xue and Koyama, 2016).2
There are specific examples of terrain’s impact influence on the GLF program. For one, Chen (2011) explains the contrast
between the death rates in Jiangxi and Anhui through taxation during the GLF period.3 On one hand, in Jiangxi, a number
of State Farms that had recently opened to developed wooded hills and mountains, marshes, and swampland. These new State
Farms were exempt from paying tax for one to three years, and taxation directly affected the residual food supply for an area.
Thus, people working on marginal land in Jiangxi had relatively greater food supply during the GLF. Anhui, on the other hand,
had fewer new State Farms established.
To assess the magnitude of my primary estimated effects, I calculate famine mortality rates (1959-61) for a counterfactual
China, that is, a China with absolutely no terrain variation. Then, I compare the mortality rates in the counterfactual state
with the observed famine mortality (1959-61) relative to the political ideology of the provincial leadership at the start of the
GLF period. I find that in the face of politically adventuristic provincial leadership and zero topographic hurdles, the excess
death rate would have been 17 percent greater than what was actually observed.4 These results have economically meaningful
implications. I estimate that rugged terrain saved 4.6 million lives during the Famine.
To further verify my estimates, I conduct a discontinuity analysis at the boundary of adventuristic and conservative
provinces. Analyzing the differential effect of ruggedness on famine mortality close to this specified boundary reduces the
likelihood of unobservable characteristics biasing my results. In this restricted analysis, the baseline results are maintained.
The estimates suggest that even for communities geographically close to one another, but under ideologically different provincial
leadership during the Great Leap Forward, ruggedness provided a differential benefit to the communities where the policies
were likely more rigorously implemented.
My paper most directly contributes to the body of research seeking answers to the why and how the Chinese Famine took
place. First, it provides more evidence that GLF policies were detrimental to the food entitlement in rural communities (Becker,
1996; Manning and Wemheuer, 2011; Riskin, 1998; Thaxton, 2008; Yang, 2012). Secondly, it reconfirms that politics played a
substantial role in the distribution of famine mortality (1959-61).
Third, and more specifically, my results confirm the dynamic relationship between of political radicalism and topographic
obstacles in Great Leap Forward implementation. This relationship is highlighted by Garnaut (2014) with the following
example:5
Conscripted labor provided an important means for the central government to extend the reach of China’s modern
transport infrastructure into rural districts at little cost to itself. Effectively, this devolved the cost of transporting
grain from the farm to the railroad onto local governments and rural households. Sichuan’s contribution of
“voluntary” laborers was particularly notable . . . The use of conscripted labor to transport grain peaked in 1960,
when severe famine in relatively accessible districts forced the state to redouble efforts to transport grain out of
more remote areas. [Provincial First Party Secretary] Li Jingquan’s contribution to the national grain transport
drive of that year was to assemble two million laborers to carry out short-distance grain transport, ensuring the
fulfillment of Sichuan’s grain transfer quota (Garnaut, 2014).
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, my research joins one country-wide study highlighting the institutional nature of
localized famine in China (1959-61). Meng et al. (2015) establish a surprisingly positive relationship between rural mortality
and per capita food production at the county-level. The authors provide additional quantitative evidence that the Great Leap
2During the Literacy Inquisition, the Qing Dynastic officials persecuted primarily intellectuals who had possible subversive
intensions. At the time, intellectuals were more or less China’s aristocratic class and were prominent in society. The authors
point out the Qing perceived their right to rule as fragile and began to strictly regulate ideology, and suggest that this was the
period when the premodern Chinese autocratic imperial state was perfected.
3Jiangxi had much lower famine mortality rates than Anhui.
4This benefit from ruggedness is not found in provinces governed by a politically conservative provincial leader and discussed
more fully in the paper.
5Sichuan’s First Party Secretary Li Jingquan is known as a particularly avid supporter of the Great Leap policies (Good-
man, 1980). This example illustrates that under adventuristic leadership, more effort was exerted to adhere to the national
development policies and accessibility played a crucial role in the logistics of policy implementation.
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Forward’s grain procurement policy was necessary for generating the paradoxical pattern but only at the provincial level.6 In
the end, my study brings countering evidence to the debate Bramall (2011) continued. Bramall uses descriptive evidence from
Sichuan province to question the existence of a pattern to famine mortality during the Great Leap Forward and concludes that
local leaders were a random driving force in the policy implementation.
The rest paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical background on the Great Leap Forward and Great
Famine. Section 3 outline the microfoundations and conceptual basis for core hypotheses in the research as well as the estimating
equations. Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 5 reports baseline results the robustness and sensitivity
check results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 The Great Leap Forward and Great Famine, 1958-1961
During the first half of the People Republic of China’s first decade (1949-55), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) developed
initial plans for the country’s transition to a socialist state. The early policies implemented by the CCP included state control
of the media, the grain market, and the redistribution of land to a large number of previously non-landowning farmers. The
initial policies for China’s socialist industrialization embodied a certain degree a gradualness in the transition towards socialism
and relied on a mentality of volunteerism among its citizens (Li, 1955).
In the second half of the 1950’s, Chairman Mao wanted China to vigorously accelerate its development. He planned for
an acceleration to coincide with the implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan which was to start in 1958. Mao referred to
this plan as China’s Great Leap Forward (henceforth referred to as the GLF). In the fall of 1957, Mao personally escalated the
rhetoric around China’s development plan making, setting a goal for China’s industrial development to surpass Britain within
15 years. In Lui Shaoqi’s May 1958 speech launching the GLF, Liu reiterates Mao’s “militant call” and warns against allowing
misgivings to interrupt progress. The magnitude of industry output was unmatched again until the late 1960s.7
A priority of the GLF was the ubiquitous establishment of People’s Communes, which were enlarged and formalized version
of agricultural cooperatives formed during the 1950s in some part of China. People’s Communes more or less corresponded
to townships or even county-units (CCP, 1958). Each commune conducted it’s administrative, governmental, economic, and
industrial functions. Commune administrators mobilized labor for public works in agriculture, provided financing for the
industry, and coordinated agricultural with industrial production. The larger size of the communes enabled administrators to
quickly mobilize more laborers. Additionally, a principal feature of the communes was the abolishment of family life.8 Without
traditional family life, women would be free from household work and could contribute to the agricultural and industrial
production potential of their commune.
The Party administered the GLF in stark contrast to their previous ideology of gradualness and volunteerism. GLF policies
were implemented with the help of the People’s Liberation Army, and full collectivization of agricultural communities took
place within a few months of the early fall of 1958.9 The role of the Army was formalized in a resolution crafted by the CCP
to direct the GLF which stipulated that cadres treat the peasants gently and let the Militia carry out stricter enforcement
(Harvard University, 1962, pp. 22). Strict enforcement refers to the mandatory nature of the GLF participation for all Chinese.
6Though, my conclusion is similar to Meng et al. (2015) in substance, there is a pattern to famine conditions that can be
attributed to the implementation of GLF policy, our data and methods differ. Ideally, I would have liked to include Meng’s
government procurement policy as a mechanism in my analysis. Specifically, I would like to examine whether or not the political
and topological factors I exploit altered grain procurement. This would help parse out my black box of a treatment effect,
which is its current form that captures GLF policies affected by accessibility and radicalism. However, upon close examination,
Meng’s constructed grain production measure is a province-level variable and the predictors of high grain productivity are
time-invariant characteristics link geo-climatic suitability for grain production, rainfall, and temperature.
7I present a graph of revenue by sector from 1949-69 in figure A.2 in Appendix A. Liu Shaoqi was chairman of the Congress’s
Standing Committee and the First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China in 1957. Later on, in 1959, Liu takes over
as the Second Chairman of the PRC from Mao.
8The CCP leader and propaganda were clear about this objective (Harvard University, 1962, pp. 21)
9Sichuan reported their communalization completed in one month (Goodman, 1980)
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For the rural person, this meant that neither commune assignment and participation nor enrollment in a regional industrial
project or irrigation project were changeable (Lin, 1990).
In the late winter of 1958, some rural communities across China began to experience food shortages. Chinese national
statistics show that the death rate grew and birth rate fell between 1959 and 1961 resulting in an unprecedented negative
population growth rate.10 The CCP officially refers to the demographic catastrophe as the “Three Years of Natural Disasters”
for which there was an excess of 15 million deaths. In this research, I use excess death rates in 1959, 60, and 61 from Cao (2005)
who estimates 32.5 million unnatural deaths. Meng et al. (2015) emphasizes that mortality above the normal rate in these
three years was almost entirely due to acute starvation and not associate disease commonly accompanying famine conditions
at other times (Thaxton, 2008).
Details about the persistence of GLF implementation and conditions through the winter of 1960-61 are not clear. In the
spring of 1961, a year before the set end of the Great Leap Forward, the policies were aborted, and aid was distributed to
disaster areas.11 Why famine conditions persisted after 1959 and what happened in the aftermath of the famine are both
difficult to assess.
2.2 Evidence of a Heterogeneous Perspective on Socialist Transition
Two fundamental features of China’s political scene in the 1950s were rarely questioned, (1) that CCP had political control
of the country and (2) that China was on a path towards becoming a socialist state. The stability of the CCP rested on the
control that Mao Zedong wielded through an intense personality cult (Westad, 2003). This dependence on Mao created an
extremely politically charge environment during the 1950s and beyond (Harvard University, 1962). However, despite Mao’s
influence, the aggressiveness with which CCP policies pursued ideological and development goals continued to be debated.
Starting in 1956, the nature of the debate changed when Mao personally aligned himself with policies that supported a
rapid pace of development. A prime example of this polarization is the 12-Year Agricultural Development Plan. The plan was
a touchstone of the political debate because of Mao’s personal investment in it (MacFarquhar, 1983). According to Goodman
(1986), the simplification of 1955-57 policy debates, epitomized by the 12-Year Agricultural Plan, as those for or against Mao’s
policies is imperfect, yet the distinction can provide a useful guide. Mao had cultivated a dichotomous political scene in which
he represented ideals. Conservatives, who argued against the aggressive leftist policies, were regarded as antagonists of Mao.
While supporters of Mao pursued his adventuristic agenda.12
A strong attempt to consolidate the Party’s perspective in line with Mao through propaganda, political interventions and
personal offenses took place during the second half of the 1950s. Mao’s political initiative, the Hundred Flower campaign
(1957-58), began as an opportunity for dynamic conversation about CCP policies but ended as means by which to purge
influential people with conservative leanings. In 1957 and 1958, the rectification campaign ousted administrators at many
levels of government. Additionally, conservatives who did not lose their positions underwent self-criticism sessions to shed their
rightest tendencies.
However, even in such a fraught political environment, some Chinese continued to vocalize their anxiety just before the
GLF began. For example, a local cadre in Fujian province was confused by the Party’s support for another “leap forward” in
1958. He said, “We were very vigorous in the first half of 1956 and were censured in the second half of the year. This year
we’re asked to be even more vigorous. Is there a bigger censure waiting?” (Harvard University, 1962)
Under the threat of purges and re-education, politicians continued to criticize the Mao’s agenda. In Gansu province, even
after the ousting of the Vice-Governor, it was reported that one-tenth of Party cadres doubted the success of the GLF (Harvard
University, 1962). Cadres in Gansu province responded in writing to the Party Center, that they would “reckon accounts with
10I present the birth, death, and population growth rates from 1949 to 1969 in figure A.1 in Appendix A. In the figure, I
outline the years of the GLF, 1959-61. The spike in death rates in 1960 illustrates the acuteness of the famine.
11Cao and Yang (2015) finds suggestive evidence that the famine conditions dissipated because of the famine mortality rate
not because of actions taken by administers.
12Adventurism refers to the willingness to take risks in politics; or actions or attitudes regarded as reckless or potentially
hazardous.
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leaders after the fall [of 1958].” These local leaders were referring to the censuring, or crisis, they expected following this “leap”.
In section 4.3, I the ways in which I quantify ideological heterogeneity at the province level.
3 Conceptual and Methodological Frameworks
3.1 Microeconomic Foundations
A fundamental administration problem existed on the ground for the CCP regarding GLF implementation. The adven-
turistic GLF agenda mandated that everyone in China act to benefit the “communal” good. Often the acts required were
detrimental to the actor. For example, local leaders in the agricultural cooperative system were required to make the peasants
labor more hours than they traditionally did in order to meet production quotas. The local leaders would then turn over the
harvest to the State, only to wait for the State to decide how much to return to the peasants for their yearly rations.
At the time of the GLF, actions taken to benefit the self or the local community was considered politically problematic.
This choice of local level administrators between “localism” and “communalism” was a decisive problem for the CCP leadership
who wanted all local level administrators to choose “communalism”. This latent decision motivates my empirical study.
I employ a formal model which follows Polinsky and Shavell (1992) who model an individual’s willingness to commit a
crime and the enforcement process. I redefine the “crime” as a district leader shirking his duty to the CCP of implementing the
GLF at the level requested by his political superiors.13 In other words, the district leader is choosing some level of “localism”
above an acceptable level as perceived by his superiors. If a local leader choose to engage too much “localism” in his decisions,
then he was punished by his superiors. Though the CCP authorities wanted to punish district leaders who implemented GLF
policies too lightly, detecting an inconsistency was costly. I assume that a district leader will always avoid implementing GLF
policies to some degree, if his benefit of shirking is greater than or equal to the punishment his expects.
I use the notation from Polinsky and Shavell (1992) to create a simple model (1). I summarize the notation below:
b ≥ p(h)d(c) (1)
b = benefit to the district leader of shirking the GLF; b is positive.
p(h) = punishment given to the district leader by the provincial government for shirking the
GLF; p is positive for h ≥ 0.
h = harm caused to the state if shirking the GLF is committed; h is positive.
d(c) = probability of detection; d is decreasing for c ≥ 0.
c = fixed enforcement costs; c is positive.
Equation (1), however, is too simple and does not take into account the political environment of the 1950s. I propose two
extensions to Polinsky and Shavell (1992)’s model which will solidify the empirical foundation of my investigation.
First, historical studies have documented that the harm to the state, h, and the benefit to the district leader, b, may not
be uniform across Chinese provinces but vary with the provincial leaders’ attitudes towards adventurism during the GLF or
conservatism. Second, the development literature has established that ruggedness of terrain, r, limits state capacity through
increasing the costs of cooperation.
Ruggedness hinders infrastructure development and restricts interactions among constituencies. Jimenez-Ayora and Ulubaşoğlu
(2015) finds that terrain ruggedness presents challenges to the provision of public goods. Nunn and Puga (2012) determines
13The socialist ideals upheld in 1950s China advocated for gender equality but it likely that a majority of district authorities
were male. For ease of discussion, I use the pronoun he when referring to these leaders.
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that topographic irregularities limited the scope of slave traders in Africa (1400-1900). And in a case study, Osborne (2013)
reports that Southeast Asia groups living near one another but separated by highly rough surfaces rarely exchange or cooperate
due to the insurmountable transportation costs they face.
I update the notation from (1) in the following ways to develop model (2). I summarize the extension to the notation below:
mj = degree of adventurism in provincial leader’s ideology; m ≥ 0 andjindicatestheprovince.
b(mj) = benefit to the district leader of shirking the GLF; b is positive for m ≥ 0.
h(mj) = harm caused to the state if shirking the GLF is committed; h are positive for m ≥ 0.
ri = measure of terrain ruggedness; r >≥ 0.
c(ri) = fixed enforcement costs; c is increasing for r ≥ 0.
Conceptually, the inclusion of provincial ideology and local terrain ruggedness alters the local cadres’ incentives to shirk.
Ruggedness reduces the likelihood of detection. While, knowledge of the general political environment within a province alters
both the benefit of shirking GLF policies and the punishment level. Equation 2 motivates my study:
0 ≥ b(mj)− p(h(mj))d(c(ri)) (2)
3.2 Determinants of Famine
To explain the causal link between the GLF policies and the famine conditions, I will rely on Sen (1986). Sen created
the “Entitlement Approach” to explain how the determinants of food acquisition determine famine conditions. Sen’s approach
does not conflate food supply, which can fluctuate with natural forces, with command over food. According to Sen, a person
has an entitlement set which is made up of (1) an original bundle of ownership, the endowment, and (2) the ability to acquire
additional bundles. A person experiences famine through the loss of the original endowment, like land or labor power, and/or
the loss the ability to acquire, like lower wages or higher prices.
A district leader’s shirking decision altered the intensity with which GLF policies specifically affected both the entitlement
and endowment set for his constituents. For example, shirking the GLF could result in relatively greater grain production
between 1958 and 1961 because Soviet agricultural practices were not implemented or individual incentives for productivity
remained in place. Additionally, districts that shirked the GLF may have relatively less overreported grain production esti-
mates resulting in lower procurement rates. Shirking could also take the form of less cooperation by community leaders with
the national programs like anti-concealment campaigns, which diminished personal food supplies and encouraged mandatory
communal dining. There are many avenues through which shirking the GLF positively impacted the endowment and entitlement
sets for residents.
3.3 Empirical Framework
Drawing on equation (2) I construct an econometric model accounting for the individual and intersecting role of provincial
adventurism and ruggedness in the distribution of famine mortality (1959-61) following Nunn and Puga (2012):
f(m, r) = β0 + β1mj + β2ri + β3mjri + ΩX
′
i + Γαj + εi (3)
for each district, i, in province, j. The outcome variable, fi, is the natural log of average excess death rate (1959-61). I capture
the adventurism of provincial leadership, mj , using one of three proxy measures (detailed in section 4.3.) I capture a district
topological accessibility using the natural log of mean terrain ruggedness, ri.
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When interpreting my core results regarding the relationship between ruggedness and famine mortality, a possible source of
concern is that the estimated differential effect of ruggedness within adventuristic provinces may be driven, at least in part, by
other geographic and demographic features. However, for an omitted variable to bias my estimated differential effect, it is not
enough that the omitted variable is correlated with famine mortality and ruggedness. It must be the case that the relationship
between the omitted factor and famine is different relative to provincial adventurism, or the relationship between the omitted
factor and ruggedness is different relative to provincial adventurism. To address the possibility of omitted differential effects,
I include the control variables: natural log of agricultural suitability, natural log of population density in 1958, the relative
importance of a district’s agricultural suitability and population density as compared with its provincial counterparts, urban
share in 1950, and the natural log of district area and an interaction of the control variable with my provincial measure of
adventurism. I include these covariates in the term X′i. Descriptions of the control variables are detailed in Section 4.4. I also
include province fixed effects, αj Finally, εi is a classical error term.
Equation (3) yields the core hypotheses of my paper:
Hypothesis 1 More adventuristic GLF policy implementation is associated with greater famine mortality; β1 > 0.
Hypothesis 2 Rugged regions are prone to underdevelopment; therefore ruggedness exacerbated famine conditions resulting
in greater mortality rates; β2 > 0.
Hypothesis 3 Under the jurisdiction of adventuristic provincial leaders, rugged terrain protected communities from the reach
of the state and limiting GLF policy implementation, β3 < 0.
3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Identification and Empirical Strate-
gies
Capturing an exogenous effect of a 60-year-old policy is difficult and my approach has advantages and disadvantages. A
primary benefit of my approach is the emphasis on a differential effect which reduces concerns about omitted variable bias.
After controlling for demographic, geographic, and political factors that may arguably be differentially related famine severity
relative to the political climate of the 1950s or terrain, I propose that the differential effect is plausibly exogenous (Angrist,
2006). However, focusing on a differential effect is also disadvantageous because a relative effect which is difficult to support
with historical narrative and to interpret.
The differential effect of ruggedness on famine mortality (ri×mj from (3)) captures a set of GLF policies that are sensitive
to changes in political pressure and physical accessibility. By that definition, many GLF policies could be included, e.g. the out-
transfer of grain, anti-concealment campaign to extract grain stored by peasants, the size of agricultural collectives, mobilization
of peasants as laborers for non-agricultural projects, restriction of exit rights from collectives, among others. Therefore, I cannot
attribute the limited famine mortality to the restriction of any one GLF policy but to an overall impact of the group of policies
implemented between 1959 and 1961 on famine.
It could be problematic for identification if other characteristics are correlated with variation in political ideology at the
provincial level. I address this concern with quantitative and qualitative evidence. I use several measures of provincial-level
support for Mao and the Great Leap Forward for robustness. Moreover, according to the historical analysis, the incentives for
provincial authorities during the Great Leap Forward were unique to that period. During no other period in Chinese history
was the exemplification of extreme devotion to the national agenda at the expense of the peoples’ well-being essential to a local
or regional politician’s success.
Finally, using a sub-provincial unit of observation allows me to control for province fixed effects, thus further confining
the differences across provinces captured in the interaction term to those differences specific to the late 1950s. However, it is
possible that GLF implementation at the local level was likely partially determined by strategic political decision-making. If
treatment spilled over across units in my sample, then the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) would be violated
and the treatment effect is biased. I consider the two most likely ways in which social interactions could have taken place: 1)
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neighbors’ GLF treatment intensity could influence each other and 2) GLF treatment intensity in a less rugged district could
displace treatment in a rugged district.
In the case of social interactions among neighboring districts, I argue that the spatially aggregate unit of analysis ensures
that the treatment effect remains credible. The district unit of analysis I use is an aggregate administrative unit, the district
which encompasses many counties, communes, towns, and communities. These smaller administrative entities, more realistically,
are at the level where strategic decisions in GLF application were being made. Therefore, causal analysis may be able to be
completed at the district level rather than a smaller administrative unit. In addition, districts do not cross provincial boundaries
and it is likely that neighbor interactions would also be confined to within provinces.
It is possible that rugged districts within a province experienced less intense GLF treatment because the provincial author-
ities focused on GLF policies more accessible areas. I address this possibility by removing the most rugged districts from the
sample and re-estimating the differential relationship between ruggedness and famine. The estimates are available in Appendix
C and the estimands are more or less the same as the baseline analysis. The similarity of estimands provides suggestive evidence
that the treatments do not violate SUTVA.
Additionally, limited exit rights from the Communes and the hukou internal passport system kept treated and untreated
rural populations from moving around the regions. 14
4 Data
4.1 Measuring Famine Severity (1959-61)
Excess mortality between 1959 and 1961 was primarily due to starvation (Meng et al., 2015). I use excess death rate
(EDR) data created by Cao (2005) to measure variation in famine mortality. EDR is the ratio of average unexpected deaths
(1959-61) and the population in 1958. The aggregation of excess death according to Cao (2005) assessed the total number of
famine-related causalities at 32.5 million. This estimation of the total death toll is far above the official estimate held by the
CCP today but below the highest estimate at 45 million from Dikotter (2010).
The basic unit my analysis is a historical sub-provincial administrative district unit known as a fu.15 I map the extent of
my sample and the unit of observation in figure 1. For ease of discussion, I will refer to the fu as a district for the rest of the
paper. In addition to the EDR, Cao (2005) created population density in 1958 and population growth rate 1953-62 data which
I use in my analysis and a covariate and placebo outcome, respectively.16 Summary statistics for the excess deaths and other
variables are presented in table 1 for my sample of 223 districts in 17 provinces.
14I assume the differential effect of ruggedness does not violate the stable unit treatment assumption (SUTVA) which means
that experimental assignment of one district has no effect on other districts’ potential outcomes. A principal characteristic of
China since the GLF period that supports SUTVA is the strict enforcement hukou internal passport system and limited exit
rights of People’s Commune members during the GLF period. The hukou system was established in the 1950s and continues
to a major demographic component today. The system identifies Chinese citizens according to the location of the household
registration which tied to social benefits. Citizens are required to live within their registration location in order to make use
of their benefits. In terms of my research question, China’s hukou system limits the mixing of treated and control populations.
Limited exit rights from People’s Commune during the GLF provides additional safeguarding against treated populations
moving into control communities.
15The fu is based on the zhou regions from early history and was a stable administrative unit for a millennium. The fu unit
was chosen by Cao (2005) to bring together demographic information across the 1953, 1964, 1982 censuses for 223 fu across
17 provinces to calculate the average excess death rate for 1959, 1960, and 1961. Fu were only recently abandoned by the
CCP (circa 1950). The 1820 boundaries of fu are published by Harvard’s CHGIS department (CHGIS, 2010; Twitchett and
Fairbanks, 1979).
16I asked Cao Shuji why he did not create data for all of China and he told me that there was no famine there. I have found
evidence that famine in Liaoning, Jilin, and Qinghai provinces was much lower than the rest of China, but there were harsh
conditions there too (Harvard University, 1962). Additionally, outside of Cao’s sample, the population is sparser and ethnic
minorities make up a large share of the population.
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4.2 Measuring Geographic Accessibility of a District
To capture the accessibility of a community, I use terrain ruggedness based on Nunn and Puga (2012). I calculate the
mean ruggedness for each district and use the natural log of it for ease of interpretation. Ruggedness is defined as the mean
differences in elevation within a 1 km2 circle around the pixel in consideration, and measures small-scale terrain irregularities
such as ravines, cliffs, etc. I calculate the mean ruggedness for each district in the baseline analysis and present the histograms
of ruggedness and excess death rates for each province in my sample in figure 2.17
4.3 Measuring Political Adventurism of a Provincial Leader
The most extreme differences in excess death rates during the Great Famine existed across provinces and not within them.
For example, Sichuan province has an average excess death rate nearly three times that of Henan province. Within Sichuan,
no district had an excess death rate below 1.6 percent, while in Henan, one district’s excess death rate was 0.3 percent. For
this reason, and because provincial level data is more readily available, research has uncovered insights into political and policy
characteristics of a province that are associated with the GLF and the famine.
To support my identification strategy, I choose provincial political measures that satisfy three criteria. The measure is,
1) associated with adventurism in GLF policy implementation, 2) likely not affected by famine conditions at the time it was
recorded, and 3) likely not affected by the accessibility of districts within a province. I choose to use the special promotion of
the First Party Secretary by 1959, the average grain output inflation rate by local leaders in 1959, and the average household
participation rate in communal dining halls in 1959. I graph the relationship between these three provincial measures in figure
3.
4.3.1 Special Promotion of the First Party Secretary by 1959
Mao appointed his followers/supporters to various important posts in order to better realize his own policy vision. These
officials, with network ties to Mao, tended to make more radical policy decisions. Yang et al. (2014) created a list of CCP full
members of the Eight Central Committee.18 The authors identify 33 of the 97 members that were “catapulted” in September
1956 from the outside to full Central Committee membership status without having to serve as an alternate member first.
Additionally, 25 new Central Committee alternate members were inducted following Mao’s own political maneuvering in May
1958. Of all of these special promotions, Yang et al. (2014) confirms that those Central Committee members who went on to
serve as the Provincial First Party Secretaries during the GLF were more often than not the recipient of one of these special,
abnormal promotions to either full or alternate CC member status. Moreover, those who received special promotions were more
likely to have historical ties to Mao and belong to Mao’s personal networks.
4.3.2 Average Grain Output Inflation Rate, 1959
Local officials competed with each other in the inflation of local grain yield in an effort to cater to Mao’s wishful thinking
about the GLF and agricultural production. Fan et al. (2016) reports the output-inflation rate by local officials in each province
in 1959. This rate is the difference between the inflated output and the real output for that year.19
Fan et al. (2016) explains that the inflation exacerbated the information gap between the central government and local
officials at the peak of the famine. Meng et al. (2015) shows that the rigidity of the grain procurement quotas, which were
17I use median ruggedness and another related measured called terrain relief for sensitivity checks. The table is available in
the appendix.
18Yang et al. (2014) created this list to further investigate the relationship between career incentives and political radicalism
explored in Kung and Chen (2011).
19In 1958, the official era of Communism began, and Mao launched a full-scale reorganization of rural households into People’s
Communes. This mass mobilization was accompanied by massive propaganda setting extravagant claims about agricultural
and industrial production targets for 1958. In 1959, the pressure for China to impress the world with her achievements for the
10-year anniversary of the PRC and in light of the overthrow of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the targets set for 1958 were
more or less re-established for 1959 (Harvard University, 1962, pp. 19-23).
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partially based on these inflated future grain yields is critical for understanding why rural mortality rates were positively
correlated with per capita food production. When grain output fell due to the collapse of the agricultural system, the central
government was still stuck with the previous high procurement quotas informed by the inflated yields led to excessive grain
procurement and, subsequently, grain shortages and famine in rural areas.20
4.3.3 Average Household Participation Rate in Communal Dining Halls, 1959
According to Yang (1996, pp. 56), communal dining hall participation was not mandated by GLF policies but was in
political favor. Therefore, it was up to local leaders whether or not to encourage their constituents to participate. Variation
in the participation rate was, therefore, correlated with the political pressure applied by provincial leadership. If a provincial
leader promoted dining hall participation in the province, then it is likely that the province was less economically developed
and had a greater degree of agrarian radicalism (Yang, 1996, pp.58-62).
4.4 Covariates
My identification strategy relies on the differential effect of ruggedness within provinces with adventuristic versus conser-
vative leadership. A possible source of concern about the validity of the empirical analysis is that the estimated effect may
be driven, at least in part, by other geographic and demographic characteristics. However, for an omitted variable to bias my
estimated differential effect, it is not enough that the omitted variable is correlated with famine severity (my baseline outcome)
and ruggedness. It must be the case that either the relationship between the omitted factor and famine severity varies with
provincial adventurism, or the relationship between the omitted factor and ruggedness varies with provincial adventurism. To
deal with potential omitted differential effects, I include each control variable and its interaction with the adventurism proxy
measure
I include the six control variables in my baseline analysis: population density in 1958, urban share in 1950, agricultural
suitability, district area, and relative importance of a district to the provincial authorities in terms of population and cropland.
I describe the reasoning for the inclusion of each control variable below.
4.4.1 Demographic Characteristics
A potentially confounding factor, which may have a differential effect on famine relative to adventurism and ruggedness
is population density. Lin (1990) proposed that the tragedy of the commons, related to restricted exit rights, contributed
to famine severity, and it is possible that the size of the commune is an influencing characteristic. Therefore, if population
density is related to the size of the People’s Communes and the size of the People’s Communes were systematically larger in
more adventuristic provinces, then this could potentially bias the estimated differential effect on famine severity. Cao (2005)
estimates population density for each district in my sample in 1958, just before the onset of the GLF.
The urban extent of a district is also a possible confounding factor of the differential effect. Urbanity could bias the
differential effect of adventurism on famine severity because (1) proposed that the economic development of a province is
likely related to the radicalism exhibited by provincial leaders, and (2) the famine conditions were primarily confined to rural
communities (Yang, 1996). I obtain an estimate of the urban share of the population for each district in 1950 by calculating
the percent of land area in the district that is rural compared to urban using GIS raster data from Klein-Goldweijk, Beusen,
and Janssen (2010).
4.4.2 Geographic Characteristics
A potentially confounding factor, which may have differential effect relative to adventurism and relative to ruggedness is
the suitability of a district for cultivation. Meng et al. (2015) presents evidence that communities in agriculturally productive
20The collapse of the agricultural system due to GLF policies is discussed in detail in Lin and Yang (2000).
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areas were likely victims of famine during the GLF. Therefore, it may be the case that more agriculturally suitable districts,
generally, have relatively low excess death rates, but under adventuristic leadership may be related to high excess death rates.
Additionally, it is likely that suitability for cultivation is related to terrain ruggedness, further biasing in the differential effect.
To control for this possibility, I calculate the average agricultural suitability of a district from Ramankutty, Foley, Norman, and
McSweeney (2002) who based their measure on mean-monthly climate data for the 1961-90 period and soil limitation data.
Bad weather has been proposed as a cause of poor harvests during the famine years, but Kueh (1995) suggests that
the severity of the bad weather was not unique to the Great Famine (Yang, 2008). The integrated climate information in
Ramankutty et al. (2002)’s agricultural suitability index may account for general trends in the probability of bad weather such
was experienced in some areas between 1959 and 1961.
Finally, a district area size may bias the differential effect if the total land area of a district may affects average administrative
quality across the jurisdictions. If ruggedness plays a role in the size of a district and the energy devoted to monitoring all
jurisdiction of a province by the provincial administers during the GLF varied with their adventuristic attitude. I control for
the size of a district using land area data from CHGIS (2010).
4.4.3 Relative Importance of a District to the Provincial Center
For Mao to achieve his goal of China surpassing Britain in industrial output within 15 years, his GLF plan needed to
extract the most agricultural and industrial output from her labor force. To push the labor force harder than ever before
towards a specific goal, provincial leaders, therefore, needed to ramp up monitoring efforts. But with scarce resources to
increase monitoring, it may have been the case that leaders focused their attention on districts with the greatest potential for
output.
Productivity is often measured in output, which in the case of rural China would be agricultural output, or number of
commercial transactions, which would be related to density of the population. A possible concern in the validity of the analysis
is if productivity is related to both adventurism and ruggedness. By controlling for the relative importance of a district in terms
of cropland and population to the greater province, I attempt to further focus the analysis on terrain ruggedness and not the
correlation between ruggedness and productivity.
I measure a district’s relative importance to the provincial authorities in terms of its total population as a percentage of
the provincial population in 1958. I also measure a district’s relative importance in terms of its estimated total cropland in
1950 as a percentage of the total provincial cropland in 1950. I calculate total cropland in a district in 1950 using raster data
from Ramankutty and Foley (1999).
5 Analysis
In this section, I present the baseline results of the differential effect of ruggedness on the famine mortality (1959-61).
Shown in figure 4, a unique relationship between the natural log of mean terrain ruggedness and the natural log of the average
excess death rate (1959-61) exists across districts in each province.
To begin my differential analysis, I analyze the differential effect from equation (3) and examine the estimands in accordance
with the core hypotheses from section 3.3. Next, I illustrate the magnitude of the results by estimating the death rate if China’s
terrain was completely flat. Additionally, I graph the kernel density estimates of the distribution of the predicted famine
mortality under different ruggedness and Secretary promotion scenarios. Finally, I present results from a variety of checks to
test the validity of the baseline effects.21
21In appendix B I investigate the role the Chinese Communist Party members may have played in making state power more
effective.
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5.1 The Differential Effect of Terrain Ruggedness and Provincial Political At-
titudes on Great Famine
By estimating equation (3), I find that districts with more rugged terrain under the jurisdiction of more adventuristic
provincial leadership experienced an additional benefit from their inaccessibility. When adventurism is captured by the pro-
motion process of the Provincial First Party Secretary, a district governed by a specially-promoted Secretary and mean terrain
ruggedness would experience a decrease in its excess death rate of 0.25 standard deviation with one standard deviation increase
in ruggedness. In comparison, a district with mean terrain ruggedness but under the jurisdiction of an ordinarily-promoted
Secretary, that same increase in terrain ruggedness would lead to a 0.42 standard deviation increase in the excess death rate.
To illustrate the magnitude of my estimates, I perform a simple calculation to estimate the counterfactual log death rate
during the Great Famine if China’s terrain was completely flat, or the cost associated with ruggedness was zero. Based on
my data, the natural logarithm of the average excess death rate was 1.33 and 0.62 in districts with a Secretary who received
a special promotion and those under the jurisdiction of an ordinarily promoted Secretary, respectively. Using the baseline
estimates reported in column 4 of Table 2, I calculate the counterfactual death rate for each district if its terrain had been flat.
This is equal to the observed log death rate minus the estimated impact of ruggedness, β̂1, multiplied by the natural log of the
district’s mean ruggedness plus the estimated impact of the interaction of ruggedness and the promotion status of the district’s
Secretary, β̂2, multiplied by ruggedness and the binary indicator for the type of promotion, i.e., ln Excess Death Ratei −
β̂1 ln Ruggednessi + β̂2 ln Ruggednessi × Special Promotion Indicatori.
I will begin by describing how terrain ruggedness related to death rates in districts in conservative provinces, which are
those provinces controlled by ordinarily-promoted Secretaries. First, I calculate the mean counterfactual death rates for these
districts if their terrain had been flat. According to the calculations, the counterfactual mean death rate for these jurisdictions
would have been 0.54 (rather than 0.62). Therefore, the death rate would have been 87 percent (0.54/0.62) of the observed
death rate if the terrain was completely flat. In other words, ruggedness explains about 13 percent of the observed death rate in
conservative provinces. This result aligns with the literature depicting ruggedness as a contributing factor to underdevelopment.
Next, I calculate the role ruggedness played in determining death rates under the jurisdiction of adventuristic leadership,
specially-promoted Secretaries. When I calculate the mean counterfactual death rate for these districts if the terrain had been
flat, I find that the counterfactual death rate would have been 1.38 (rather than 1.33). Therefore the death rate would have
been 103 percent (1.38/1.33) of the observed death rate if the terrain was completely flat. This result means that the death
rate would have been 3 percent greater than the observed death rate if the terrain had been flat. This result aligns with the
core hypothesis of this paper, that topography shielded communities from the extractive nature of the GLF.
Finally, I bring together the comparisons from the above paragraphs. I compare the observable death rates in district
governed by a specially-promoted Secretary with the counterfactual death rate if the area was completely flat and governed
by an ordinarily-promoted Secretary. The counterfactual death rate would be 1.16 (0.87 × 1.33) Therefore, in the presence of
uniformly flat terrain, the death rate would have been 83 percent (1.16/1.38) of the counterfactual death rate if authorities
were conservative rather than adventuristic.22 The indirect effect of ruggedness explains 17 percent of the observed death rates
in provinces governed by specially-promoted Secretaries.
To make the magnitude of this result more understandable, the total observed death toll (1959-61) in districts under the
control of specially-promoted Secretaries was 27.6 million people and the average death rate was 6.6 percent (the total 1958
population was 415.7 million). According to my calculations, the counterfactual death toll in these provinces would have been
5.5 percent (0.17× 6.6), translating to 22.9 million deaths (0.055× 415.7 million). This means that rugged terrain saved more
than 4.6 million people from famine-related deaths in 1959, 60, and 61 (27.6 - 22.9 million) across Anhui, Gansu, Guangdong,
Guangxi, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, Sichuan, and Yunnan.
My baseline results are presented in Table 2. Column 1 presents the simple within-province relationship between ruggedness
and famine mortality. The coefficient on ruggedness is not statistically different from zero. In columns 2-4, I include covariates
22Remember that 1.38 comes for the earlier paragraph where terrain is flat under adventuristic leadership.
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in the specifications. According to the coefficient on ruggedness in these first four columns, it seems that, on average across
China, the correlation between ruggedness and famine mortality is more or less zero.
In Columns 5-7, I present the estimates for the common effect of ruggedness on famine mortality in conservative provinces
and it differential effect for provinces under adventuristic leadership, mj , during the GLF period (mj × ri). The measure of
“adventurism” used in a specification corresponds to the model’s panel heading. Columns 2-10, mj is a binary indicator of
whether or not the Provincial First Party Secretary obtained his position through a special promotion captures variation in
mj . In columns 8-10, mj is measured using the average rate at which local leaders in a province inflated grain output in 1959.
The specifications presented in columns 7 and 10 includes all control variables and are the most cautious estimates. I find
similar results across the two proxy measures of provincial adventurism. In these specification a few results are clearly displayed.
First, provincial adventurism during the GLF is positively related to famine mortality, β1 > 0 from (3). This is consistent with
the historical literature characterizing the GLF as a contributing factor in the Great Famine. I also find weak evidence that
ruggedness is positively related to famine mortality, β2 > 0 from (3). This is consistent with higher costs of trade, construction,
and agriculture that is associated with ruggedness and hypothesis 2. The coefficient estimate for ruggedness interacted with the
provincial measure of adventurism is negative, β3 < 0 from (3). This differential effect for provinces with potential for greater
GLF implementation is consistent with hypothesis 3.
I further examine the differential role of rugged terrain by converting the continuous measure used previously to a three-level
categorical measure and re-estimate equation (3) using communal dining rates as the proxy for provincial adventurism. I present
the coefficients in Table 3. In order to easily compare smooth and rugged districts, I set the base level of the categorical measure
of ruggedness for a district to ”medium ruggedness” or, in other words, with three quantiles of ruggedness, Ruggedness = 2 is
the base. I find that the coefficient of Low ruggedness×Adventurism is positive and statistically significant. These estimates
imply that districts with relatively smoother terrain had greater famine mortality in adventuristic jurisdictions. Moreover, the
coefficient of High ruggedness× Adventurism is negative and statistically significant, which implies that the communities in
the most rugged terrain were better off than those located in moderately rugged terrain. Therefore, when the communal dining
rate is used to proxy for provincial adventurism, the benefit of rugged terrain on famine mortality is multifaceted.
5.2 Assessing the roles of Topography and Politics in the Great Leap Forward’s
Determination of Famine Conditions
To clarify the impact of the differential effect of ruggedness and provincial adventurism on famine mortality, I answer two
sets of hypothetical questions and graph the predicted famine mortality in each speculative setting.
The panels in Figure 5 correspond to three subsets of the dataset assessed for two scenarios. In each panel, I graph the
kernel density estimates (KDE) of the distribution of the predicted famine mortality. In panel A, districts with ruggedness
below the 33 percentile are assessed. Likewise, Panel B contains district in the middle third (34th to 66th percentile), and panel
C contains district with ruggedness above the 66th percentile.
Given my estimates from column 7 of Table 2, I ask, “what would famine mortality have been if all provinces had been
administered by First Party Secretaries promoted through the ordinary process?” This hypothetical situation is illustrated by
comparing Scenario 1 across the panels Figure 5. Next, I ask, “what if all Secretaries had received special promotions?” This
other hypothetical situation is illustrated by comparing Scenario 2 across the panels of Figure 5.
When comparing Scenario 1 (ordinarily-promoted Secretaries) across the three panels, the KDE looks fairly similar regardless
of a district’s terrain. However, when comparing Scenario 2 (special-promoted Secretaries) across the three panels, the KDE
shifts to the left as ruggedness increases (the KDE for Scenario 2 is further to the left in panel C as compared to panel A.) This
rightward-shift or decrease in the average natural log of the excess death rate under Scenario 2 relative to ruggedness captures
the benefit that rugged districts incurred from their topography.
Likewise, in Figure 6, I also answer a series of hypothetical questions related to changing terrain ruggedness. I create three
terrain scenarios while maintaining the actual promotion process for the Secretary. In Scenario 1, I set all districts’ ruggedness
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equal to the 10th percentile in my sample. This means that all districts have fairly smooth terrain. The corresponding
hypothetical question is, ”what would famine mortality have been if all districts had had smooth terrain?” The logic continues
for increasing rugged terrain in Scenarios 2 and 3 (moderately rugged terrain), in which I set all districts’ ruggedness to the
50th percentile and 90th percentile (highly rugged terrain), respectively.
In Figure 6 I graph the KDE of the distribution of the predicted famine mortality under these three scenarios for districts
under the administration of a Secretary who obtained his position through the ordinary promotion process (Panel A) and
for districts under the administration of a specially promoted Secretary (Panel B). In Panel A, the KDE under Scenario 1
is positioned to the left of Scenario 5 which implies that ruggedness exacerbates famine mortality under more conservative
authority, while in Panel B, the KDE under Scenario 1 is positioned to the right of Scenario 3 implying ruggedness somewhat
mitigates famine severity when the authorities are more adventuristic.23
5.3 Testing the Validity of the Estimated Effect
First, s a basic identification assumption, I propose that variation in three measures of adventurism at the provincial level
used in my baseline analysis, special promotion of the First Party Secretary, grain output inflation rate, and communal dining
hall participation rate, were unaffected by the outcome, famine mortality, or other important source of variation, the terrain. I
further support this assertion when I re-estimate (3) using often cited measures of GLF adventurism at the province level, (a)
the net grain procurement ratio in 1959 and (b) the average excess death rate (1959-61) which are likely and problematically
affected by terrain and the Famine. Grain procurement numbers are likely confounded by the role that ruggedness played in the
procurement process and provincial death rates are a post-treatment measure of adventurism and highly correlated with the
outcome, district-level death rates.24 In Table 4, I re-estimate (3) using two potentially confounded measures of adventurism.
In columns 1 and 2 of table 4, I set mj equal to the provincial net procurement rate and in columns 3 and 4, I set mj equal to
the provincial excess death rate. In column 2, net procurement, mj , is negatively related to famine mortality, β1 < 0 from (3).
This result is inconsistent with the historical literature characterizing the GLF as a contributing factor in the Great Famine and
hypothesis 1. Likewise, ruggedness is negatively related to famine mortality, β2 < 0 from (3). This result is also inconsistent
with higher costs of trade, construction, and agriculture that is associated with ruggedness and hypothesis 2. Finally, the
coefficient estimate for ruggedness interacted with this measure of “adventurism” is positive, β3 > 0 from (3). This differential
effect for provinces with greater net grain procurement is inconsistent with hypothesis 3. In column 4, the average provincial
death rate (1959-61) is used as a proxy measure of provincial-level political adventurism. The signs on β1, β2, and β3 are not
as strikingly at odds with the core hypotheses of this paper, but the role that ruggedness plays is neither economically nor
statistically significant. The poor performance of net grain procurement and provincial death rates in the empirical framework
of this paper provides evidence that the measures of adventurism used in the primary analyses are unrelated to the outcome
and terrain and that the interaction of (mj × ri) is exogenous in the baseline analysis.
Next, I empirically test the assumption that the indirect effect of ruggedness (mj × ri) is limited to the GLF period by
conducting a placebo test using an outcome that pre-dates the GLF, the natural log of the population growth rate between 1953
and 1958. Table 5 presents the results for each of the three measures of adventurism, with and without the full set of baseline
covariate. Across all specifications, I find that β1, β2, and β3 are not statistically different from zero and their magnitudes
are small. These estimates imply that the variation in GLF adventurism, ruggedness, and their interaction had little role in
determining population growth during the 1950s and provide some support for that the treatment of interest is likely the GLF.
For further sensitivity testing, I assess how much the estimates of the primary estimands change when 1) alternative
measures of ruggedness are used, 2) districts with extremely high and low death rate are removed from the sample, 3) the most
rugged or the least rugged districts are removed, and 4) when the analysis is conducted on 16 of the 17 provinces in the sample,
rotating through each province’s removal. In each of these specifications, I find that the estimands remain more or less the
23I conduct a similar version of this assessment for output inflation rate and dining hall participation rate and present the
graphs of the respective changes are similar to the ones presented for promotion processes.
24 Provincial procurement information comes from conversation with Dr. Yang and data related to his work, Yang (1996).
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same as the primary analysis.25
5.4 Regression Discontinuity Analysis
A regression discontinuity design enables the estimation of causal effects by exploiting discontinuities in incentives or ability
to receive a discrete treatment (Athey and Imbens, 2017). In the setting of the GLF, I estimate the causal effect of the
GLF by comparing outcomes for districts on either side of the boundary between provinces administered by a First Party
Secretary who obtained his promotion through a special promotion by 1959 and those provinces under the jurisdiction of an
ordinarily-promoted Secretary.
The key feature of the design is the presence of an exogenous variable where the probability of GLF treatment, the nature
of promotion of the First Party Secretary, changes discontinuously at the physical boundary of the province type. Generally
speaking, the basis for the identification strategy modeled in equation (3) embodies this key feature.
In this section, unlike the baseline analysis, I restrict the districts in the analysis to those either touching the boundary
between the two province types or those only one district removed from the boundary. I map this boundary in figure 7.
The narrow bandwidth across the discontinuity ensures better balance on the unobservable characteristics of districts being
compared in the analysis.
A crucial characteristic of a valid RDD is that the rule being exploited to analyze the discontinuity needs to arbitrary. In
my analysis, the boundary or rule being exploited lies along a provincial border. These borders are not arbitrary but have been
located according to historical, economic, and social drivers. Constructing the discontinuity along the provincial boundary may
be problematic. To assuage some concern, I present the balance of covariates on either side of the boundary relative to the
First Party Secretary’s promotion process in table 6.
According to the difference in means presented in table 6 for demographic and geographic characteristics assessed across
the specified provincial boundaries exploited in this RDD analysis, neither set of provinces is more densely population, more
rugged, or more urban than the other set. This pattern is true for the sample of districts that lie directly adjacent to the RDD
boundary (Panel A), districts that are adjacent to the boundary and set one back from the boundary (Panel B), and for the full
sample of districts used in the baseline analysis (Panel C). With the samples created for the RDD analysis, however, average
agricultural suitability along the provincial boundary of interest is significantly higher in the provinces governed by a First
Party Secretary who gained his position through a special promotion. This correlation between a specially-promoted Secretary
and relatively higher agricultural suitability may reflect the industrial drive to maximize grain output from “grain surplus”
areas (Garnaut, 2014). An imbalance in observable characteristics, however, like agricultural suitability in this situation, may
be addressed by incorporating proxy variable into the analysis as an additional covariate.
Given that most observable characteristics are similiar across on either side of the border, I conduct a RDD analysis and
present the results in Table 7. The specifications presented in column 1 and 2 use the 79 districts that reside directly on the
boundary between provinces differentiated by promotion type, while the specifications in columns 3 and 4 include additional
districts which are located one district removed from the boundary of interest, totaling 138 districts.
The results in column 1 and 3 are similiar to the baseline results, thereby providing additional evidence that the GLF
impacted famine severity (1959-61). As demonstrated in previous sections, the differential effect of ruggedness on famine
severity in provinces with an adventuristic leader shown in column 1 and column 3 is negative and statistically significant,
β3 < 0 from equation (3).
In columns 2 and 4, population growth between 1953 and 1958 is used as the outcome measure and plausible placebo test.
Like the results shown earlier in table 5 is not a significant the impact of ruggedness on population growth before the Great
Famine. This results confirms that a discontinuity in demographic change since Communist rule is not systematic along the
boundary I exploit in this RDD analysis.
25I provide the tables for when alternative measures of ruggedness are used, districts with extremely high and low death rate
are removed from the sample, the most rugged or the least rugged districts are removed in Appendix C.
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6 Conclusion
Terrain ruggedness has been linked to underdevelopment because of the higher associated costs for trade and cultivation.
However, ruggedness also limits the reach the state which may have benefitted remote communities between 1958 and 1961
when the CCP enacted Chairman Mao Zedong’s extractive and dangerous political agenda, the Second Five-Year Development
Plan, more commonly known as the Great Leap Forward (GLF). I find that variation in the enthusiasm with which provincial
authorities implemented the new policies, together with variation in terrain irregularities, determines a portion of famine
mortality during the Great Famine (1959-61).
My results provide the first subprovincial causal evidence of a systematic pattern of famine mortality highlighting both
the anthropogenic origin of the Great Famine and the direct link between Mao’s GLF program and the demographic disaster.
To assess the magnitude of my estimated effects, by comparing observed mortality rates with a counterfactual, a China with
completely flat terrain. I find that in the face of adventuristic leadership and zero topographic hurdles, the excess death would
have been 17 percent greater than the observed death rate. This implies that, in these adventuristic provinces, rugged terrain
saved 4.6 million lives during the Famine, which I propose is due to restrained GLF implementation.
My findings contribute to the historical debates about the importance of GLF policies in explaining part of the famine
morality between 1959 and 1961 and provide evidence that Mao Zedong through the reach of the state was influential in the
magnitude of the disaster.
References
Angrist, J. (2006). Instrumental variables methods in experimental criminological research: what, why and how. Journal of
Experimental Criminology 2, 23–44.
Ashton, B. (1984). Famine in China, 1958-61. Population and Development Review 10 (4), 613–645.
Athey, S. and G. Imbens (2017). The state of applied econometrics: causality and policy evaluation. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 31 (2), 3–32.
Becker, J. (1996). Hungry ghosts: Mao’s secret famine. New York: The Free Press.
Bernstein, T. (1984, May). Stalinism, famine, and Chinese peasant: grain procurement during the Great Leap Forward. Theory
and Society 13 (3), 339–77. Special Issue.
Bernstein, T. (2006). Mao Zedong and the Famine of 1959-1961. The China Quarterly 186, 421–45.
Besley, T. and T. Persson (2013). Taxation and Development, pp. 51–110. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Bramall, C. (2011). Agency and famine in China’s Sichuan province, 1958-1962. The China Quarterly 208, pp.990–1008.
Cao, S. (2005). Da jihuang: 1950-1961 nian de Zhongguo renkou (The Great Famine: China’s population 1959-1961). Hong
Kong: Shidai guoji chuban youxian gongsi.
Cao, S. and B. Yang (2015). Grain, local politics, and the making of Mao’s Famine in Wuwei, 1958–1961. Modern Asian
Studies 49 (6), 1675–1703.
CCP (1958). Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the establishment of People’s Communes
in rural areas (peitaiho resolution). In Communist China 1955-1959: Policy documents with analysis, pp. 454–56. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, Center for International Affairs (1965).
Chang, G. and G. Wen (1997). Communal dining and the Chinese famine of 1958-1961. Economic Development and Cultural
Change 46 (1), 1–34.
17
Chang, G. H. and G. J. Wen (1998). Food availability versus consumption efficiency: Causes of the Chinese Famine. China
Economic Review (1043951X) 9 (2), 157 – 165.
Chen, Y. (2011). Eating Bitterness: new perspectives on China’s Great Leap Forward and Famine, Chapter Under the same
Maoist sky: accouting for death rate discrepancies in Anhui and Jiangxi. Vancouver: UBC Press.
CHGIS (2010, Dec.). China historical GIS, version 5. Accessed March 2013 at http://www.fa.harvard.edu/~chgis.
Dikotter, F. (2010). Mao’s Great Famine: the history of China’s most devastating catastrophe, 1958-62. London: Bloomsbury
Publishing.
Fan, Z., W. Xiong, and L.-A. Zhou (2016). Information distortion in hierarchical organizations: a study of China’s Great
Famine. Working Paper .
Garnaut, A. (2014). The geography of the Great Leap Famine. Modern China 40 (3), 315–48.
Goodman, D. (1980, March). Li jingquan and the south-west region, 1958-66: The life and “crimes” of a “local emperor”. The
China Quarterly (81), 66–96.
Goodman, D. S. (1986). Centre and Province in the People’s Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Harvard University (1962). Communist China 1955-1959: Policy documents with analysis. Technical report, Prepared at
Harvard University under the Joint Auspices of the Center for International Affairs and the East Asian Research Center,
Cambridge, MA.
He, Z. (1997). A history of telecommunications in China: development and policy implications, Chapter Chapter 3, pp. 55–87.
Hampton Press,.
Houser, D., B. Sands, and E. Xiao (2009). Three parts natural, seven parts man-made: bayesian analysis of China’s Great Leap
Forward demographic disaster. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 69, 148 – 159.
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Figure 1: Provinces and subnational districts in sample
Note: Dark grey region is the subset of districts used in the analysis and those for which Cao (2005) estimated
famine mortality. The district unit is based on the 1820s zhou administrative unit. Their boundaries are
available at CHGIS (2010).
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Figure 2: Histograms of the natural log of the excess death rate and the natural log of ruggedness by province
(a) Excess death rate
(b) Ruggedness
Source: Cao (2005) created excess death rate data and Nunn and Puga (2012) provided ruggedness data.
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Figure 3: Relationship between the three proxy measures of provincial-level political adventurism
Source: Special promotion is a binary measure which refers to whether or not the First Party Secretary in
1959 received his position through a special promotion or through an ordinary process (Yang et al., 2014).
Output inflation is a continuous measure of the average inflation rate of grain output for each province in
1959 (Fan et al., 2016). Communal dining is a continuous measure of the average participation rate of rural
households in the communal dining halls for each province in 1959 (Yang, 1996). Please see section 4 for
description of the data.
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Figure 4: Within province relationship between ruggedness and famine mortality









































































































































































Figure 7: Map of districts touching the boundary between provinces with and without a specially promoted
First Party Secretary included in the regression discontinuity analysis






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: The differential impact of terrain ruggedness on famine mortality (1959-61)
Dependent variable: ln(Excess death rate (1959-61))
Adventurism proxy: Special promotiona Output inflationb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Adventurismc 2.957∗∗∗ 2.898∗∗∗ 2.915∗∗∗ 2.752 3.005∗∗∗ 3.371∗∗ 3.448 0.058∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.373) (0.347) (2.779) (0.438) (1.597) (2.417) (0.008) (0.012) (0.023)
Ruggedness -0.131 -0.180∗ -0.116 -0.089 0.210 0.297 0.489∗ 0.432∗ 0.409∗ 0.507∗
(0.092) (0.092) (0.094) (0.101) (0.289) (0.238) (0.251) (0.221) (0.247) (0.264)
Ruggedness -0.425 -0.552∗∗ -0.689∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
× Adventurism (0.306) (0.260) (0.273) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Pop. density -0.043 0.107 -0.203 -0.232 0.079 -0.177 -0.020
(0.149) (0.168) (0.356) (0.239) (0.348) (0.314) (0.409)
Pop. density 0.419 0.277 0.085 0.002 0.002
× Adventurism (0.394) (0.296) (0.397) (0.002) (0.002)
Ag. suitability 0.115 0.230 1.113 1.890∗∗ 2.457∗∗ 0.722 0.982
(0.167) (0.155) (0.944) (0.949) (1.036) (0.844) (0.885)
Ag. suitability -0.952 -1.878∗ -2.330∗∗ -0.004 -0.005
× Adventurism (0.959) (0.968) (1.050) (0.005) (0.005)
Importance (pop.) -2.156 -1.078 1.401 -0.337 0.799 0.838 2.828
(2.036) (1.952) (2.752) (2.718) (2.690) (4.076) (3.886)
Importance (pop.) -3.836 -3.380 -3.362 -0.030 -0.035
× Adventurism (4.062) (4.069) (4.023) (0.028) (0.028)
Importance (ag.) 4.863∗∗ 1.699 2.775 2.901 -1.031 5.312 2.460
(2.230) (2.424) (4.552) (3.225) (4.245) (5.364) (6.730)
Importance (ag.) -1.427 2.844 3.579 0.003 0.001
× Adventurism (5.303) (4.360) (5.150) (0.036) (0.047)
Urban share -1.882∗∗∗ -2.322∗∗ -3.571∗∗∗ -3.723∗∗∗
(0.559) (1.170) (1.281) (1.420)
Urban share 0.598 1.980 0.011
× Adventurism (1.328) (1.420) (0.009)
District area 0.243 0.075 0.363 0.227
(0.161) (0.370) (0.362) (0.442)
District area 0.213 -0.141 0.000
× Adventurism (0.399) (0.401) (0.003)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.520 0.532 0.548 0.543 0.528 0.541 0.560 0.535 0.545 0.563
Observations 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets.
a Special promotion is a binary measure which refers to whether or not the First Party Secretary in 1959 received his position
through a special promotion (Adventurism=1) or through an ordinary process (Adventurism=0) (Yang et al., 2014).
b Output inflation is a continuous measure of the average inflation rate of grain output for each province in 1959 (Fan et al.,
2016).
c The measure of adventurism is a provincial-level measure and the type of adventurism used in the specification is indicated
in the table heading.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Heterogenous impact of terrain on famine mortality (1959-61) relative to political adventurism
Dependent variable: ln(Excess death rate (1959-61))
Adventurism proxy: Communal Dininga
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adventurismb 0.338∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.056) (0.076)
Categorical Ruggednessc
Low Ruggedness 0.114 -3.273∗∗∗ -2.846∗∗∗ -2.716∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.982) (0.974) (0.968)
High Ruggedness -0.018 1.360∗ 1.372∗ 1.538∗∗
(0.173) (0.717) (0.724) (0.712)
Low Ruggedness 0.042∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
× Adventurism (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
High Ruggedness -0.016∗ -0.017∗ -0.019∗∗
× Adventurism (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic covariatesd No No Yes Yes
Baseline covariatese No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.512 0.551 0.565 0.579
Observations 223 223 223 223
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets.
a Communal dining is a continuous measure of the average participation rate of rural households in the communal dining halls
for each province in 1959 (Yang, 1996).
b The measure of adventurism is a provincial-level measure and the type of adventurism used in the specification is indicated
in the table heading.
c This categorical transformation of ruggedness is a 3-tiered categorical variable with the base level set to level 2, medium
ruggedness.
d Covariates included in this model are ln(population density, 1958) and ln(agricultural suitability). These covariates’ interaction
with the adventurism measure indicated in the table heading are also included.
e Covariates included in this model are basic covariates plus the relative importance of district in terms of population and
cropland, urban share, and fu size. These covariates’ interaction with the adventurism measure indicated in the table heading
are also included
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: The impact of ruggedness when the proxy measure for political adventurism may be confounded
with actual food insecurity
Dependent variable: ln(Excess death rate (1959-61))
Adventurism proxy: Net grain Average death
procurement, 1959a rate for provinceb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ruggedness -0.676 -1.120∗∗ -0.042 -0.050
(0.499) (0.457) (0.131) (0.140)
Adventurismc -1.396∗∗∗ -1.063∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.368) (0.027) (0.243)
Ruggedness 0.025 0.045∗∗ -0.019 -0.009
× Adventurism (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline covariates No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.521 0.556 0.521 0.557
Observations 223 223 223 223
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets.
a Net grain procurement is a continuous measure of the actual grain procurement rate reported at the province level in 1959
(Yang, 1996).
b The average death rate for the province is the mean death rate for all districts (fu) in the province.
c The measure of adventurism is a provincial-level measure and the type of adventurism used in the specification is indicated
in the table heading.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
32
Table 5: The differential impact of terrain ruggedness impact on a placebo outcome
Dependent variable: ln(Population growth rate (1953-58))a
Adventurism proxy: Special Output Communal
promotionb inflationc diningd
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Adventurisme -0.016 -1.166 -0.000 -0.017∗∗ -0.000 0.023
(0.123) (1.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.014) (0.029)
Ruggedness -0.016 -0.022 0.061 -0.035
(0.066) (0.076) (0.068) (0.069)
Ruggedness 0.043 0.015 -0.000 0.000
× Adventurism (0.073) (0.083) (0.000) (0.000)
Categorical Ruggednessf
Low Ruggedness 0.077 0.210
(0.352) (0.347)
High Ruggedness -0.027 0.201
(0.389) (0.362)
Low Ruggedness -0.001 -0.002
× Adventurism (0.004) (0.004)
High Ruggedness 0.000 -0.002
× Adventurism (0.004) (0.004)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.161 0.116 0.165 0.107 0.144
Observations 222 222 222 222 222 222
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets.
a The average population growth rate between 1953 and 1958 is reported for each fu in the sample expect for Zhenyuan Zhou
in Yunnan province by Cao (2005)
b Special promotion is a binary measure which refers to whether or not the First Party Secretary in 1959 received his position
through a special promotion (Adventurism = 1) or through an ordinary process (Adventurism = 0) (Yang et al., 2014).
c Output inflation is a continuous measure of the average inflation rate of grain output for each province in 1959 (Fan et al.,
2016).
d Communal dining is a continuous measure of the average participation rate of rural households in the communal dining halls
for each province in 1959 (Yang, 1996).
e The measure of adventurism is a provincial-level measure and the type of adventurism used in the specification is indicated
in the table heading.
f Categorical Ruggedness transformed into 3-tiered categorical variable, base level is set to level 2.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Balance of Covariates Across RDD Samples and Baseline Sample
Promotion type:a Ordinary Special
Mean Mean Difference pb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Sample: Districts adjacent to the RDD boundaryc
ln(Excess death rate (1959-61)) 0.925 1.671 0.745*** 0.008
ln(Pop. density (1958)) -5.332 -5.242 0.090 0.694
ln(Ruggedness) 0.238 0.271 0.033 0.893
ln(Ag. suitability) -0.470 -0.386 0.085* 0.07
Urban share 0.093 0.077 0.017 0.456
Obs. 35 44 79
Panel B
Sample: District adjacent to the RDD boundary and one away
ln(Excess death rate (1959-61)) 0.672 1.637 0.965*** 0.000
ln(Pop. density (1958)) -5.248 -5.16 0.089 0.601
ln(Ruggedness) 0.191 0.211 0.020 0.916
ln(Ag. suitability) -0.498 -0.385 0.113** 0.015
Urban share 0.082 0.099 0.017 0.367
Obs. 54 84 139
Panel C
Sample: Full set of districts from baseline analysis
ln(Excess death rate (1959-61)) 0.617 1.329 0.712*** 0.000
ln(Pop. density (1958)) -5.177 -5.336 0.158 0.31
ln(Ruggedness) 0.155 0.193 0.038 0.827
ln(Ag. suitability) -0.496 -0.515 0.019 0.823
Urban share 0.078 0.095 0.017 0.276
Obs. 63 160 223
Notes: See test in section 4 for definitions.
a Promotion type refers to the binary indicator of the promotion process of the provincial First Party Secretary between 1956
and 1959. For each province in the sample, the Secretary either received his promotion through an ordinary process of moving
up through the ranks or through a special promotion in which he made an atypical jump to his new Secretary position (Yang
et al., 2014).
b A test of equality of means of districts (fu) in provinces under the jurisdiction of an ordinarily-promoted Secretary and a
special-promoted Secretary.
c This sample of districts in depicted in figure 7.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 7: Discontinuity analysis of the differential impact of terrain ruggedness on famine mortality
Sample: Districts touching the boundarya Districts on boundary and one awaya
Dependent variable: Excess death Population Excess death Population
rate, 1959-61 growth, 1953-58 rate, 1959-61 growth, 1953-58
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adventurismc 5.567 -0.906 6.910∗∗∗ -0.388
(3.571) (1.457) (2.605) (1.011)
Ruggedness 0.569 -0.160 0.246 -0.002
(0.530) (0.133) (0.229) (0.076)
Ruggedness -1.058∗ 0.173 -0.679∗∗ -0.012
× Adventurism (0.589) (0.156) (0.269) (0.088)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 79 79 138 138
Adj. R2 0.592 0.083 0.668 0.025
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets.
a The sample of district used in this analysis is presented in figure 7 and in panel A of table 6.
b The sample of district used in this analysis is presented in panel B of table 6.
c Adventurism refers to the binary indicator of the promotion process of the provincial First Party Secretary between 1956
and 1959. For each province in the sample, the Secretary either received his promotion through an ordinary process of moving
up through the ranks or through a special promotion in which he made an atypical jump to his new Secretary position (Yang
et al., 2014).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A.1: Birth, death, and growth rates for the China from 1949-69
Source: Data is from NBS (1990)
A Appendix: Graphs of Chinese Statistics, 1949-69
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Figure A.2: Production output by sector, 1949-69
Source: Data is from NBS (1990)
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B Appendix: CCP membership rates and state power
By the middle of the 1950s, there was another dimension to China’s political landscape, the density of CCP members in
a provincial population. Yang (1996) introduces CCP member density in 1956 as a driver of loyalty compensation. Loyalty
compensation, as explained by Yang, means that lower-level political elites who were already party members possessed the right
political credentials for future career advancement, unlike their non-member counterparts who demonstrated their loyalty to the
political center by adopting radical measures. Yang posits that one-way provincial authorities with low CCP membership rates
among their constituents compensated for their deficiency was by pushing for greater participation in the communal dining halls
by rural households during the GLF. At the provincial level, the correlation between CCP membership in 1956 and communal
dining rates is -0.5 while CCP membership and the special promotion of the First Party Secretary is 0.1 and the grain output
inflation rate is 0.4.
In Table B.1, I examine the role of CCP membership in explaining the distribution of famine severity. In column 1,
using CCP membership as an alternative proxy of adventurism, mj , and re-estimate (3). The coefficient of interest, β3 on
the interaction term (mj × ri) is not statistically significant. Unlike the proxy measures of adventurism used in my primary
analysis, there is no evidence that the density of CCP members defined a dimension of the “reach of the state”.
Next, I explore the role of CCP member density in the integrity of my results. To summarize the principal takeaway from
this investigation, I find that when the CCP member density is low, the differential effect of ruggedness becomes insignificant.
This reduced magnitude could be the case because of treatment effect dilution or migration.
I re-estimate (3) for mj set to the proxies from the primary analyses: special promotion, output inflation, and communal
dining rate but on a subset of provinces. In columns 2-4, I only include provinces for which CCP membership density was
greater than 1 percent. In columns 5-7, I only include provinces for which CCP membership was less than 1 percent. I chose 1
percent as a the boundary because it split the provines fairly evenly.
For the analysis conducted on provinces with relatively greater CCP member density, when special promotion and output
inflation are used to proxy for adventurism (columns 2 and 3), the estimates mirror the baseline estimands, providing evidence of
the relevance of the quasi-experiment on which this paper is based. However, when communal dining is used as the adventurism
proxy (column 4), the estimates differ and are insignificant. This alteration in the economic and statistical impact of communal
dining may be due to its correlation with CCP member as explained by Yang (1996).
For provinces where CCP membership was less than 1 percent, I find that the coefficients of β2 and β3 are inconsistent
with the core hypotheses of this paper. The implication of these economic and statistically insignificant estimands is that the
theoretical basis for my “experimental” GLF treatment is corrupted in these provinces. It is possible that loyalty compensation,
as termed by Yang (1996), captured by the lack of member density introduces radical policy forces that do not vary with the
reach of the state, thus distorting the impact of the GLF by either diluting the treatment effect or encouraging treatment
migration.
There is one other possible explanation for the role of CCP member density in securing the treatment effect (mj × ri)
and could rely on the communication structure within the CCP party apparatus At the time of the GLF, the telecom sector
was poor and the party apparatus influenced the pace of communication infrastructure development. Citing a 1984 report by
the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to the State Council, He (1997) suggests that investment in telecom was not a
high priority to the Party because the party elites were connected to one another through a system of private communication
networks, courier services, and red telephones.
In summary, I find that using variation in provincial adventurism and district-level ruggedness which determines the intensity























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C Appendix: Tables of sensitivity checks
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Table C.1: Impact of terrain on famine mortality (1959-61) relative political adventurism when extremely
high death rates are removed
Dependent variable: ln(Excess death rate, 1958-61)
Adventurism proxy: Special Output Communal
promotiona inflationb diningc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Adventurismd 2.527 3.167 0.065∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(2.447) (2.670) (0.023) (0.024) (0.077) (0.077)
Ruggedness 0.489∗ 0.461∗ 0.518∗ 0.462∗
(0.251) (0.270) (0.274) (0.271)
Ruggedness -0.650∗∗ -0.656∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
× Adventurism (0.277) (0.293) (0.002) (0.002)
Categorical Ruggednesse
Low Ruggedness -2.640∗∗∗ -2.583∗∗∗
(0.953) (0.949)
High Ruggedness 1.542∗∗ 1.674∗∗
(0.721) (0.714)
Low Ruggedness 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
× Adventurism (0.011) (0.011)
High Ruggedness -0.019∗∗ -0.020∗∗
× Adventurism (0.009) (0.009)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.536 0.522 0.538 0.525 0.556 0.546
Observations 217 212 217 212 217 212
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets.
a Special promotion is a binary measure which refers to whether or not the First Party Secretary in 1959 received his position
through a special promotion or through an ordinary process (Yang et al., 2014).
b Output inflation is a continuous measure of the average inflation rate of grain output for each province in 1959 (Fan et al.,
2016).
c Communal dining is a continuous measure of the average participation rate of rural households in the communal dining halls
for each province in 1959 (Yang, 1996).
d The measure of adventurism is a provincial-level measure and the type of adventurism used in the specification is indicated
in the table heading.
e This categorical transformation of ruggedness is a 3-tiered categorical variable with the base level set to level 2, medium
ruggedness.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
41
T
ab
le
C
.2
:
Im
p
ac
t
of
te
rr
ai
n
on
fa
m
in
e
m
o
rt
al
it
y
(1
95
9-
61
)
re
la
ti
v
e
p
ol
it
ic
al
ad
ve
n
tu
ri
sm
w
h
en
ei
th
er
th
e
ro
u
gh
es
t
an
d
sm
o
ot
h
es
t
te
rr
ai
n
is
re
m
ov
ed
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
:
ln
(E
x
ce
ss
d
ea
th
ra
te
,
19
58
-6
1)
A
d
ve
n
tu
ri
sm
p
ro
xy
:
S
p
ec
ia
l
p
ro
m
ot
io
n
a
O
u
tp
u
t
in
fl
at
io
n
b
C
om
m
u
n
al
d
in
in
g
c
R
em
ov
ed
:
T
op
20
R
em
ov
ed
:
T
op
20
R
em
ov
ed
:
T
op
20
S
a
m
p
le
:
B
a
se
li
n
e
R
ou
gh
es
t
S
m
o
ot
h
es
t
B
as
el
in
e
R
ou
gh
es
t
S
m
o
ot
h
es
t
B
as
el
in
e
R
ou
gh
es
t
S
m
o
ot
h
es
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
A
d
v
en
tu
ri
sm
d
3.
4
48
5.
2
36
∗∗
2.
73
6
0.
06
6
∗∗
∗
0.
06
6∗
∗∗
0.
06
1∗
∗
0.
39
2∗
∗∗
0.
41
9∗
∗∗
0.
34
7∗
∗∗
(2
.4
17
)
(2
.5
75
)
(2
.5
38
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
87
)
R
u
gg
ed
n
es
s
0.
48
9
∗
0.
44
9∗
0.
83
1∗
0.
50
7∗
0.
64
7∗
∗
0.
40
4
(0
.2
51
)
(0
.2
49
)
(0
.4
28
)
(0
.2
64
)
(0
.2
62
)
(0
.3
88
)
R
u
gg
ed
n
es
s
-0
.6
89
∗∗
-0
.6
71
∗∗
-1
.0
12
∗∗
-0
.0
04
∗∗
-0
.0
05
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
04
×
A
d
ve
n
tu
ri
sm
(0
.2
73
)
(0
.2
74
)
(0
.4
46
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
C
a
te
go
ri
ca
l
R
u
gg
ed
n
es
se
L
ow
R
u
gg
ed
n
es
s
-2
.7
16
∗∗
∗
-2
.7
91
∗∗
∗
-2
.8
41
∗∗
∗
(0
.9
68
)
(0
.9
56
)
(0
.9
92
)
H
ig
h
R
u
gg
ed
n
es
s
1.
53
8∗
∗
1.
53
0∗
∗
1.
38
8∗
(0
.7
12
)
(0
.7
20
)
(0
.7
55
)
L
ow
R
u
gg
ed
n
es
s
0.
03
5∗
∗∗
0.
03
5∗
∗∗
0.
03
6∗
∗∗
×
A
d
ve
n
tu
ri
sm
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
12
)
H
ig
h
R
u
gg
ed
n
es
s
-0
.0
19
∗∗
-0
.0
19
∗∗
-0
.0
17
∗
×
A
d
ve
n
tu
ri
sm
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
B
as
el
in
e
co
va
ri
at
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
56
0
0.
58
3
0.
57
2
0.
56
3
0.
59
6
0.
56
9
0.
57
9
0.
60
5
0.
59
3
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
22
3
20
3
20
3
22
3
20
3
20
3
22
3
20
3
20
3
N
o
te
s:
C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
w
it
h
ro
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
a
S
p
ec
ia
l
p
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
is
a
b
in
a
ry
m
ea
su
re
w
h
ic
h
re
fe
rs
to
w
h
et
h
er
o
r
n
o
t
th
e
F
ir
st
P
a
rt
y
S
ec
re
ta
ry
in
1
9
5
9
re
ce
iv
ed
h
is
p
o
si
ti
o
n
th
ro
u
g
h
a
sp
ec
ia
l
p
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
o
r
th
ro
u
g
h
a
n
o
rd
in
a
ry
p
ro
ce
ss
(Y
a
n
g
et
a
l.
,
2
0
1
4
).
b
O
u
tp
u
t
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
is
a
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
m
ea
su
re
o
f
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
ra
te
o
f
g
ra
in
o
u
tp
u
t
fo
r
ea
ch
p
ro
v
in
ce
in
1
9
5
9
(F
a
n
et
a
l.
,
2
0
1
6
).
c
C
o
m
m
u
n
a
l
d
in
in
g
is
a
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
m
ea
su
re
o
f
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
ra
te
o
f
ru
ra
l
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
in
th
e
co
m
m
u
n
a
l
d
in
in
g
h
a
ll
s
fo
r
ea
ch
p
ro
v
in
ce
in
1
9
5
9
(Y
a
n
g
,
1
9
9
6
).
d
T
h
e
m
ea
su
re
o
f
a
d
v
en
tu
ri
sm
is
a
p
ro
v
in
ci
a
l-
le
v
el
m
ea
su
re
a
n
d
th
e
ty
p
e
o
f
a
d
v
en
tu
ri
sm
u
se
d
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
is
in
d
ic
a
te
d
in
th
e
ta
b
le
h
ea
d
in
g
.
e
T
h
is
ca
te
g
o
ri
ca
l
tr
a
n
sf
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
o
f
ru
g
g
ed
n
es
s
is
a
3
-t
ie
re
d
ca
te
g
o
ri
ca
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
w
it
h
th
e
b
a
se
le
v
el
se
t
to
le
v
el
2
,
m
ed
iu
m
ru
g
g
ed
n
es
s.
∗
p
<
0
.1
0
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
42
